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Introduction
Broadly speaking, the individual transformative processes in post-communist Europe are
embedded in a dramatic shift in the terms--and the institutional framewor~--in which identity and
security are defined. During the Cold War, these states had been part of a coherent international
subsystem; that is, the communist framework of domestic politics was reinforced by a broader socialist
international context, producing a rough congruence between international alignment and domestic
political systems. Indeed, as defined by Soviet power, the ~loc alliance was designed precisely to
reinforce and maintain the socialist order within states. Socialist internationalism was presented as a
guarantor system for the identity and security of its constituent states; the possibility of conflicting ·
identity claims within the bloc, in the form of ethnonational tensions, for example, was rejected in favor
of a formula that proclaimed fraternal coincidence of interests. 1989 demonstrated, if any demonstration
were necessary, that the logic of this framework was far from consensual. The question of an alternative
logic for the preservation of security and identity, however, remained open ..
Most of the post-communist European governments looked to the West forincorporation into a
framework that seemed equally coherent: a democratic capitalist order whose domestic logic was
reflected in the international setting by a network of multilateral institutions that were .themselves
underpinned by the norms of what I have elsewhere called the democratic capitalist peace. NATO
expects its membership to be democratic and capitalist, as does the European Union. Thus, here too, the
gross logic of affiliation was that similar domestic systems would be coordinated and reinforced by
transnational institutions.
There were considerable incentives for eastern states to seek affiliation with Western multilateral
institutions. NATO and the European Union in particular appeared to offer a highly favorable context for
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safeguarding economic and security interests. The consensus on the desirability of "joining Europe" by
way of these primary institutions was thus very widespread among the leaderships of the transitional
states, all of whom (with the exception of the Bulgarian leadership's often problematic outlook on
NATO) persistently and explicitly set NATO and EU affiliation as a central foreign policy goal. The
important point to emphasize here is that from the outset, the democratization projects of postcommunist
central Europe were nested within the larger strategy of 'joining Europe." Superficially, the demands of
affiliation and the dictates of domestic transformation were complementary, for at the most general level
the expectations of democratized capitalism would be best realized through association with the EU, and
NATO membership would rescue East Central Europe from the "grey zone" in which states were reliant
on ad hoc guarantees and self-protection. In practice, however, the embeddedness of the domestic
agenda in the broader framework of the attempt to join Europe was considerably more problematic.
In this analysis, I will be concerned with the structure of the European environment at the level
of the state and of multilateral actors, and the ways in which this structure frames domestic politics of
transitional Eastern European regimes. How are such international influences internalized, and with what
consequences? The most direct and obvious effect is on the political agenda. In the European
post-communist cases, the international context not only generates new items on policy agenda but also
transforms or penetrates it, particularly insofar as aspirations to join Europe entail a detailed and
sustained accommodation with the existing requirements and norms of multilateral organizations on a
broad range of domestic policy issues. Indeed on the most fundamental issues there are: type of political
regime, the economic system, and the ethnonational bargain. The scope of this effect means that the
impact of the international environment can extend beyond and through the question of what individual
issues politicians may argue about, beyond the agenda as such, to the organization, dynamics and
stability of the political process.
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It is impossible to explore the full dimensions of the problematic interaction between domestic
and international forces in a chapter. Rather, I will explore certain aspects·ofthe Slovak case from this
perspective. Slovakia's troubled transition is an excellent case study in the dynamics of the
internationalization of domestic politics, because it occupies a theoretically useful middle ground
between those transitional regimes that are clearly responsive to the expectations of external actors, and
those, particularly in the Balkans, that are profoundly problematic. On what Slovak leaders like to call
the "objective indicators"--economic performance--Slovakia had earned a place in the first tier of
eligibles for European integration. By 1995, measure by measure, Slovakia stood up well even by
comparison with th~ Czech Republic, the acknowledged "bloc champ," in everything but employment
levels, boasting a high growth rate in GDP and industry, and greater budgetary restraint than its Czech
neighbor.
[insert Tabl~ 1 about here]
Yet in that same year, Slovakia, initially included in the first tier of eligibles for Euro-membership,
increasingly began to be omitted from the A-list. The problem lay in its tortured domestic politics and its
troubled ethnonational situation. Slovakia now must confront the fact that the course of its
postcommunist transformation has bred increasing tension over the way in which its search for identity ·
and security fits into the larger framework of European politics. In this analysis, I will first define a ·
theoretical context for the analysis, before turning to the Slovak case, which I will treat first in its
domestic setting before looking at Slovak politics·oftransformation through the prisi:n of its interaction
with external actors.

STATE OF THE FIELD
Any attempt to analyze identity and security questions in the postcommunist states of central
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Europe cannot ~ yet find a secure_ footing in the explosion of democratization scholarship that has
attended the so-called "third wave" of global democratization. Scholars of transitions from authoritarian
rule came rather belatedly to the acknowledgment of the importance of both identity politics and
international context to the transition process. The seminal study by O'Donnell and Schmitter of the
early phases of the "third wave," for example, explicitly discounted the central relevance of the
internaticmal environment to the dynamics of regime transition and was mute on the subject of ethnic
conflict. 1 -The wave of postcommunist transitions, in fact, were pivotal in rethinking both issues, a
process that is still in the early stages of conceptualization. The case study of Slovakia in this paper is
therefore both a specific attempt to address the dynamics of identity and security-in a new state, and a
broader effort to engage the democratization literature on issues that warrant further theoretical
development.
Scholars of democratization who have begun to explore international influences on domestic
transitions from authoritarian rule--most notably Laurence Whitehead and Philippe Schmitter--have
sought to catalogue differential forms of external impact, both purposive attempts to influence the
'

,

course of democratic transition and consolidation, and the more diffuse effects of the structure of the
international system and prevailing norms. The debate is provisional and fairly general; it focuses
largely on the development of topologies designed to capture different forms of international effects. To
the alliterative categories of contagion, consent, and coercion proposed by Whitehead, Schmitter adds a
fourth: conditionality. 2 Coercion, defined to refer to regime impositions such as the democratization of
post-war Japan and Germany, is not relevant to the post-communist transitions.
The other three warrant closer attention. Contagion effects center on the transmission of
resonant information: the attractiveness of foreign models of governance, or the demonstration or
snowballing effects of neighboring regime transitions. Conditionality is borrowed from the lexicon of

multilateral lending organizations to embrace the efforts of all multilateral institutions to condition the
"provision of benefits on appropriate democratic behavior. The category of consent is not strictly parallel
to the previous three, since itis the sole category designed to encompass both international impact and
internal response; indeed, it suffers from some ambiguity on this count. Its clearest international referent
is the grant of recognition to an emergent regime within its claimed territory, a particularly salient issue
for multinational or secessionist states. It should be evident that Whitehead and Schmitter make their
primary contribution in the domain of purposive actor behavior designed to encourage democratization
in the target state; they are far less concerned with the impact of broad structural features of the
international context. Indeed, it is this concentration of focus that makes their analysis useful in the
Slovak case. For Slovakia is a transitional state that does not face clear international enemies who would
benefit. from domestic instability, and a state targeted by the ongoing interventions of external actors who
seek to provide incentives for domestic de,:nocratic consolidation.
The Schmitter-Whitehead categorization thus has the virtue of capturing some of the central
kinds of directe<;l internatjonal impact on domestic regime change. Because such analysis is in a
preliminary stage, however, it is not sufficiently elaborated. Not only do the central concepts need
further unpacking, but above all they are deficient, or rather underdeveloped, in a most important respect.
International influences of this sort are not, after all, a hypodermic injection into a body politic. The
exercise of international influence is an interactive process, the outcome of which depends not only on
the content and strategies of external actors, but also the character of the domestic response, which quite
evidently is not, and could not be expected to be, uniform across cases. International attempts at
influence must operate on its targets through distinctive perceptual filters and through the existing
structure of domestic politics, considerations that point to the need for a more dynamic conception of the
impact of external factors on the democratization project. 3
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In this analysis of the troubled Slovak search for identity and security, I will try to address the
dynamics of "conditionality" in particular, by tracing the interactions between important Slovak political
actors and the attentive community of multilateral institutions, states, and NGOs that have tried.to affect
.the direction of postcommunist consolidation. 4 In this undertaking, the identity question is not an
extraneous independent variable; the presence or absence of ethnonational contestation of the stateness
question is a central factor in determining the responsiveness of domestic politics to international
interventions, and the contested identity of the Slovak state is not only a focus of external concern, but
also a central determinant of Slovak official willingness to play the game of good Euro-citizenship.
The democratization literature itself is in some respects even more provisional in its treatment of
ethnicity and democratization than is true of the international dimension. 5 The clear exception is the
attention devoted to the issue by Linz and Stepan in their ambitious and comprehensive treatment of
democratization and consolidation in the third wave, in which they addressed the "undertheorized"
stateness question, albeit from a largely domestic perspective. 6 The rudimentary treatment of that issue
in the democratization literature is echoed in tum by the relative novelty of attention to ethnonational
identity issues in European foreign policy. The least developed component of the framework for
international cooperation through western multilateral institutions before 1989 was that of safeguards to
ethnonational identity. By and large, the member states of Western multilateral organizations, while
formally acceding to norms of mutual tolerance embodied in the charter of the Council of Europe,
showed considerable deference in their scrutiny of each other's internal policies. On the rare occasions
when internal identity conflict erupted onto the multilateral agenda, the issues were framed in terms of
individual, rather than group rights. A case in point is the conflict in Northern Ireland, which external
actors treated largely in terms of the human rights of dissidents to fair and timely legal proceedings. In
Western Europe, the most important conflicts over ethnonational identity did in fact occur within states;
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crossboundary ties were a secondary problem, and the primary manifestation of concern about.external
identity threats centered on migration from outside the core area. It was the collapse of the European
communist state system that spurred greater attention to the problem of ethnonational conflict, and the
first serious elaboration and codification of norms regarding the preservation of ethnonational identity.
The scholarly need to come to terms with identity problems in post-communist states thus coincides with
the diplomatic security need to cope with these same problems.
Elsewhere, I have developed a more elaborated argument about the variables that condition ·
responsiveness of postcommunist governments to external expectations and attempts to impose
conditionality. 7 There I suggest that responsiveness is shaped by I) policymaking capabilities of the
state, that is, it!;, capacity to respond; 2) the incentives-and disincentives for responsiveness to external
cues in the strategic political environment with respect to: government coalition maintenance and ·
electoral strategies and 3) more specifically, the embeddedness of identity politics in that-strategic
political environment. In the following sections, I will discuss the domestic political environment in
Slovakia in such a way as to shed light on these factors, before turning to Slovakia's interactions with
external actors.
Domestic Context
Slovakia emerged from the shadow of the Czech Republic with the dissolution of the
Czechoslovak state in 1992. There was a widespread hope that statehood would also contribute to the
routinization of Slovak politics by freeing it from the focus on battles with Prague over jurisdiction and
constitutional questions. N<;metheless, Slovakia remains plagued by-a stateness question, and by the
attendant metapolitical controversies that attend it, as well as by the intensely personalized and
controversial politics that swirl around the person of Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar. 8 I will
sketch the main features of this political context in order to analyze more intensively the extent to which
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it constrains or facilitates a response to external expectations.
Slovakia's distinctive pattern of post-communist leadership contestation is a clue to its political
travails. The governments of three-time Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar have twice fallen between
elections, in April 1991 and March 1994, after mounting internecine quarrels with his leadership and·
organized defections from his government. Initially designated Prime Minister while he was still part of
the Public Against Violence (PAV) movement that had emerged to challenge communist rule in tandem
with the Czech Civic Forum in November 1989, Meciar withdrew from PAV in the wake of the fall of
his first government in the spring of 1991 to form his own•v~hicle, the Movement for a Democratic
Slovakia (MDS). The electoral success of the MDS in 1992 swept him back into office, initiating a
second and somewhat more prolonged tenure that nonetheless was marked by personal antagonisms and
defections from his party that eroded his parliamentary majority; this minority government fell in March
1994, giving way to a miscellaneous coalition of the previous opposition parties under Prime Minister
JosefMoravcik that served until Meciar's MDS bested them yet again in the fall 1994 elections.
Returned to power a third time, Meciar now set his sights on the consolidation of his own party's
position and the discrediting of his rivals, who by then included the MDS-selected Slovak President
Michal Kovac, who had cooperated in the second Meciar ouster. Post-independence politics in Slovakia
has thus been most distinctive.in its highly personalized polarization into two camps, pro-Meciar and
anti-Meciar. In itself, this polarization has taxed the adjustment to democratic politics, putting heavy
strain on the accountability linkages of the system. Meciar's two ousters have meant that he has never
faced an electoral accounting for his stewardship, but rather has contested each subsequent election as a
renewed challenger. In tum, the anti-Meciar governments of 1991-1992 and 1994 have been unable to
win an electoral mandate. The political elites that can ':"in elections cannot govern harmoniously, and
the elites capable of cooperating in power cannot win elections. As we will see, this unfortunate
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dich_otomy has serious implications for Slovak governmental response to international conditionality
initiatives, since the unelectable governments have proven far more responsive to external expectations
than havethe Meciar governments.
The ensuing confrontation between Meciar and his opposition has permeated all aspects of the
I

transformational politics .. In consolidating power, Meciar has taken actions that raise serious doubts
about democratic consolidation in Slovakia. His government has maintained a firm grip ori Slovak
television, subsidized supportive newspapers and undercut critical ones, freezing them out of the
journalistic access channels and questioning their loyalty to the state. After the 1994 election, his third
government challenged the continued parliamentary representation of the opposition Democratic Union
·(whose core leadership is comprised of former MDS officials whose defection toppled the secondMeciar
government) by opening police and parliamentary inve~tigations of the party's electoral eligibility.
Most dramatically, the MDS has been locked iri a protracted and thus far inconclusive conflict
with institutions beyond his direct control, notably the constitutional courts (a problem he has proposed
to "solve" with a restrictive constitutional amendment on the power of the courts) and the presidency .
.President Kovac is regarded within the MDS as having brokered the fall of the second Meciar
government. Since the 1994 elections, the Meciar government has used all available legal channels to
constrict presidential prerogatives, repeatedly slashing Kovac's official budget and transferring his
appointment powers to the government or parliament. Lacking the necessary three-fifths majority to
change the constitution or impeach Kovac, the MDS has nonetheless passed symbolic votes of
no-confidence in him, called for his resignation and toyed with the utilization of a ref~rendum to remove
him. In August 1995, the president's son was abducted from Slovakia by persons unknown, and
deposited in Austria, which in effect exposed him to questioning in a German investigation of corporate
fraud. This bizarre incident suggested an escalation of the stakes of the systemic conflict--an effort to

11
discredit the president through extra-legal channels. Evidence pointed to the complicity of the Slovak
Intelligence Service (SIS), whose director was one of the appointive positions removed from presidential
jurisdiction the previous spring and vested in the parliament. The pursuit of this trail, however, was
blocked by the removal ofregular police investigators who announced they were-pursuing the SIS link.
The expiration of Kovac' s presidential term in 1998 raises the specter of a parliamentary deadlock on
selecting his successor, which would allow Meciar to ex~rcise presidential functions until the next
parliamentary elections in 1999. The opposition, unable to gain legislative approval for the direct
presidential elections that would forestall this outcome1 have resorted to gathering signatures for a
popular referendum on the question. The battle over the presidential office continues, and Meciar' s
conflict with his opposition has continued to impede the mechanisms of democratic accountability in the
fledgling state.
Above all, Slovak politics has clearly far to go before the concept of a loyal opposition becomes
an operational reality. In 1996, the parliament twice approved, and the president twice vetoed, a law on
the "protection of the republic," an amendment to the penal code that levied penalties ofup to seven
years in prison for public rallies "aimed at the subverting of the constitutional system, territorial integrity
or defense capability of the republic, or at destroying its independence." A particularly controversial
clause providing that those "who damage the interests <?f the republic" by disseminating "false
information" be liable to two year jail sentences was deJeted in the second version. Media and
opposition alike viewed this initiative as a sword of Damocles suspended above them, for Meciar's party
has tended to interpret criticism -of the coalition government as disloyalty to the state. Pursuant to the
second presidential veto of this legislation in early January 1997, the parliament failed to pass a third;
revised version. However, draft "state of emergency" kigislation is currently under consideration that
provides for suspending civil liberties in periods of crisis.

12

The economic transition has proceeded within this highly charged political environment.
Although there is little doubt that Slovakia has made considerable economic progress, there is criticism
both at home and abroad of the lack of ''transparency" of the economic transition. Privatization in
particular, has been a major battlefield, in which Meciar's opposition has charged him with dispensing
the state's economic holdings to cronies and party loyalists in a process that raises considerable questions
about the openness and regularity of the transfer of state-owned property to the private sector. The
cancellation of the second wave of so-called coupon privatization in midstream (a process launched by
the 1994 Moravcik government) in favor of the compensation of coupon-holders with state bonds
redeemable after the next parliamentary elections was both unpopular and controversial in raising
questions as to the identity of the beneficiaries of this P,Olicy reorientation. To many, Meciar's economic
policy seems a base for clientilism and an extension of his colonization of the political space.
Finally, successive Meciar governments have pursued policies that fueled continued controversy
over the Slovak relations with the substantial Hungarian minority, some 11 percent of the population
concentrated along Slovakia's southern border with Hungary. This issue will be discussed in the next·
section. First, I will conclude the current section by emphasizing a feature of the internal domestic
context that is critical to understanding the impact of external efforts to influence domestic
developments: Le., the polarization of politics into pro- and anti-Meciar camps, with profound
implications for parliamentary governance. Because Meciar's opposition is loath to enter an MDS
government on his terms and the Hungarian minority parties are politically risky coalition partners, a
parliamentary majority for the MDS is currently possible only with the support of two smaller parties. Of
the two, the Slovak National Party (SNP) is the most strategically important and has had the most
pronounced impact on the political agenda. Although it -would be too much to say that the SNP holds the
government hostage to its own conception of identity politics, its program and orientation has certainly
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constrained the government's flexibility in responding to domestic and foreign criticism on mino;ity
issues. The government's dependence on the SNP, however, should be understood in the context ofMDS
policies that discourage the formation of alternative coalitions. In turn,· an alternate government coalition
that excludes the MDS is numerically impossible without the Hungarian minority parties, and electorally
impossible with them. This is particularly important because the opposition, when in power, did in fact
pursue policies that won international approval, on minority policies and other issues. Thus, the electoral
and parliamentary coalition-building arenas of Slovak politics prove to be problematic for the successful
exercise of external constraint on Slovak democratization policy and economic restructuring.

_Identity Politics And The Hungarian Minority
The challenge for Slovakia, and for other new or newly transformed states, is to formulate a
workable postcommunist identity in such a way as to meet international expectations; the alternative is to
jeopardi:z;e the entire project of joining Europe. This challenge operates both on the symbolic level and in
the concrete form of the arrangements of power, decisionmaking and policy content. And it is a
challenge because external expectations may well run counter to the internal dynamics. At base, the issue
is the answer to the questions: Whose state is this, and how and from what should it be protected?
For Slovakia, a central problem is the incorporation of its substantial Hungarian minority (some
eleven percent of the population) into the political design of the state, and the meshing of the identity
claims of that minority with those of the Slovak majority in a state recently emergent from the larger
-multinational context of Czechoslovakia. The fact thttt the Slovak state is new is not in itself a fully
distinguishing factor.· Existing states like Roll).ania must also grapple with the significance of
multinational diversity, as indeed must any state with an unresolved ethnonational bargain.
Under such circumstances, one can confidently expect a faultline between those in the majority
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national grouping who perceive the state as the apotheosis of the ethnonational identity of the dominant
national grouping, on the one hand, and those who would prefer to constitute the state as an expression
of a multinational community and to invoke what theorists call a "civic" nationalism as the glue that
binds together the citizenry. Both perceive the project of identity-building as a security problem,
differently construed. For those championing a basically ethnonational conception of the state,
enshrining the national identity in symbolic language and espousing a basically majoritarian definition of
democracy is perceived as a bulwark against not only the erosion of the core identity of the dominant
group, but also, at the extreme, a barricade against territorial erosion of the state. Those who
accommodate to the concept of the state as a multinational project are more receptive to constraints on
the majoritarian principle; they in tum perceive security risks stemming from the alternative
ethnonational principle of state identity. Subjection of minorities to a definition of state identity that
excludes them is likely to breed continued minority grievances. The important point is that these
divergent viewpoints do not confront each other in a debating forum, but within the political process, and
in fact act upon the political process itself.
Indeed, it should be noted that these alternative visions of the state correspond to two ideal
typical polarities in construction of democratic institutions. On the one hand, institutional design can
favor majoritarian decision rules (single-member districts with plurality voting, presidentialist systems),
with rights vested in individuals and policy choice bas~d on aggregated individual tallies. The
alternative is a system design that maximizes voice and veto power of minority coalitions--a system with
strong consociational features: proportional representation, multiple veto and aqcess points (federal,
bicameral, parliamentary), mandated consultation or inclusion of defined interests in government
decisionmaking, and reserved domains of policymaking for protected groups. 9 The first-ethnonational--formulation of state identity corresponds in political logic to that of majoritarian
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democracy, and the second--civic nationalism in an avowedly multinational state--corresponds in logic to
the more consociational form.
Since independence, the Meciar government has adopted a sometimes equivocal position on
these core questions of identity and institutional design. The thrust of government policy and rhetoric,
however, has pushed Slovakia toward an ethnonational construction of state identity. The following
indicators may help.summarize this thrust. The first indicators are the product of symbolic politics: the
wording of the constitutional preamble, which speaks in the name of the "Slovak nation" rather than the
"citizens of Slovakia," and legal constraints, passed in ·1996, on the use of Hungarian emblems, anthems
and other symbols.
Other initiatives impinge directly on the capacity of the Hungarian minority to maintain its
identity. Cultural guarantees are one such area. Minority language rights were a controversial issue from
the first, but the language law of 1990 did provide recognition of such rights in regions with a threshold
percentage of ethnic Hungarian citizens. The Moravcfk government of 1994 went further, passing
legislation that permitted Hungarian regions to post bilingual signs, and acknowledging the right of
Hungarian women to maintain their names without Slovakized endings. The educational and
language-use guarantees promulgated by earlier governments eroded under Meciar's third government,
however, with a new policy of"alternative" bilingual education and a law, passed in November 1995,
that enshrined Slovak as the official language and established an inspectorate (dubbed the "language
police") to enforce it, throwing the previously mandated right to use minority languages into limbo. A
promised corrective, a minority language law, has been ·repeatedly postponed. In tandem, subsidies in
support of minority institutions have been slashed, and a significant amount of the minority budget for
media redirected to Hungarian-language publication of official Slovak media. This latter is highly
relevant in the present climate.. A government that has been generally intolerant of criticism has been
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especially unreceptive to Hungarian claims. The penal code amendments were widely seen as targeting
the minority, for example.
_Slovakia's institutional design has gravitated further toward a majoritarian model since
independence. All Slovak politicians decry the idea of territorial autonomy in areas of minority
population concentration. Further, the government revised the regional administrative boundaries
inherited from the communist state in legislation passed. in 1996 over a presidential veto. The new
'

north-south regional boundaries distribute the Hungarian population so to water-down their local
majorities, and currently only one of the newly appointed 8 regional and 79 district heads is not an ethnic
Slovak. Although the government initially denied any intention to parlay this administrative revision
into an electoral gerrymander, it announced plans in Ft:bruary 1997 to debate a move from proportional
representation to a plurality system with majoritarian impact. Such a move wouid generally favor the
MDS as the largest party, but it is also especially troubling to the Hungarian minority, whose
representational voice under such a system would depend heavily on the way electoral districts were
drawn. Proportional representation is generally seen as a safeguard of legislative representation for
minorities, and its abandonment raises the possibility of undermining the already limited Hungarian
political clout, and. strengthening the Slovak parties within the political system.
All of the indicators just mentioned militate in favor qf an ethic conception of the state, both in ·
terms of symbolic politics and institutional design. Taken as a whole, they represent an unpalatable
ethnonational bargain for the Hungarian minority. It is important to understand, however, how this
incrementally developed understanding of the state emerged from the dynamics of party politics.
In 1989, in the wake of the Velvet Revolution, the fluidity of the nascent party system and the
of the democratization
formula offered
scope to alternative forms of response to existing or
ambiguity
'
.
'
potential societal cleavages and in particular to the issues posed by the incorporation of the Hungarian
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minority into the political process. The Public Against Violence, counterpart to the Czech Civic Forum
as a holding company for broad anti-communist political forces, harbored a range of disparate
tendencies, and-included a Hungarian organization (the Hungarian Independent Initiative) under the big
political tent. The possibility thus seemed to exist for a party politics that was not completely
ethnonationally segmented, notwithstanding the presence of anindependent Hungarian movement,
Coexistence, in the first electoral campaign. The defection of its leader, Miklos Duray, from the larger
PAV movem.ent was significant because Ouray was the most prominent of the communist-era dissidents
engaged in championing minority rights, and among the few Slovak-based signatories of Charter 77--a
largely Czech movement-- from Slovakia. His choice, said to have been predicated on government
refusal to establish a powerful minority rights office headed by Ouray himself, was the harbinger of the
eventual fate of Hungarian participation in Slovak politics in general. Since the following electoral cycle
in 1992, Hungarian political activity has been channeled exclusively through ethnically Hungarian
parties. _
They thus constitute an enclave within the larger party.system, highly successful in mobilizing
the target minority electorate, but extremely unsuccessful in gaining voice and access to government and
policymaking influence. No Hungarian politician has served in the government or in a position of
parliamentary responsibility since the inauguration of the state in 1993, 10 and no Hungarian policy
initiative has met with success since-the installation of the third Meciar government in 1994. Only the
interim Moravcik government of 1994--a government that both needed tacit Hungarian support to remain
in office and wanted western approbation--attended to Hungarian claims.

It is further important that since the ascension of the third Meciar government to power in 1994,
even the Slovak opposition has remained significantly aloof from its Hungarian counterparts. Although
both oppositions find the incumbent government profoundly disturbing, they have substantially refrained
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from coordinated critiques, and the Slovak opposition has been reluctant to dissent even from nationalist
governmen~ gestures targeting the minority that breed international concern. Why?
Prominent in the political logic of the domestic situation is the perception of the Slovak
opposition that cooperation with the Hungarian minority invites electoral retaliation. Parties "in both
non-Meciar governments paid the electoral penalty for perceived .leniency on the Hungarian question,
while the MDS campaigned as the true champion of Slovak interests in 1992 and 1994. Both the earlier
inclusion of the Hungarian Independent Initiative under the PAV umbrella and the Moravcik
government's legislation of minority guarantees fueled MDS charges that their opponents were
subservient to Hungarian interests. This despite the fact that the Moravcik government, which needed
Hungarian deputies' votes for a parliamentary majority, carefully calibrated its relations with the
Hungarian parties by coupling legal concessions with the exclusion of the Hungarians from cabinet posts
in the formal governing coalition.
The parties that comprised the Moravcik government, now in opposition, apparently concluded
after their electoral savaging at the hands of the MDS in the September.1994 that the politics of
multinational accommodation had exposed them to the erosion of support from ethnic Slovaks. Such
erosion cannot be compensated by Hungarian votes, since Slovak parties are in no position to outbid
Hungarian parties on minority rights issues that are of central concern to the Hungarian electorate. This
aloofness necessarily excludes alternative government coalitions inclusive of Hungarian parties. As the
head of the Party of the Democratic Left said tersely after the 1994 election, any project that envisioned
the formation of a governmental alternative to Meciar on the basis of collaboration with the Hungarian
parties was "unrealistic." In terms that Giovanni Sartori originally applied in his analysis of polarized
pluralism of the left and right, 11 Hungarian parties are simply "uncoalitionable"--they are not currently
eligible coalition partners for any viable Slovak-based government.
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The same considerations appear to have discouraged opposition defense of Hungarian interests
against government initiatives .. When the,MDS coalition presented its controversial language law in
1995, one Slovak opposition party abstained, the rest supported it, and-the president signed it--all of them
reluctantly, but even more reluctant to give Meciar an effective political weapon against them. The
opposition challenged, and the President unavailingly vetoed, the government's administrative
redistricting not because of its disadvantages to Hungarian minorities, but on the grounds of its
discrimination against Bratislava. Thus, the polarization of Slovak politics into two camps has left the
Hungarian parliamentary coalition divided even from the rest of the opposition, uncoalitionable in
governance and unsupported in its policy claims.
This is the strategic situation within which the question of the Hungarian place in the formulation
of the identity of the Slovak state has been played out, and it is this strategic environment in which a
series of Hungarian proposals have been defeated and a series ofrestrictions and potential restrictions on
their political position enacted. This is also, of course the strategic situation in which external actors
attempt to intervene, a question addressed in the final section of this essay.

International Context of Domestic Transformation
In reviewing the relevant external actors, the dramatis personnae is extensive and diverse :
multilateral institutions, west European governments, US government and neighboring states (in the c~se
of Slovakia, particularly Hungary.and Romania). This list is not, however, miscellaneous; an important
first step is to recognize that the external environment is structured, both by the normative and utilitarian
logic of interlocking multilateral institutions, and by the desire of postcommunist governments to
affiliate with these institutions. Even in the absence of clear central direction, the core logic of external
expectations is fairly uniform: sustained progress in democratizing, marketizing and resolving
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ethnonational tensions. Underlying this expectation is the corollary assumption that such progress will
breed stability in external and internal politics. This is the stuff of good Eurocitizenship that creates
entitlementsto membership in NATO and the EU. Although the prize may be NATO and EU
membership, however,.the way stations to that goal require responsiveness to the total complex of
additional multilateral institutions that have. gatekeeping functions.
Two multilateral organizations are worthy of specific note: the Council of Europe (CE) and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Although Western multilateral institutions
have not negotiated a formal division of labor, the CE and OSCE took early and parallel action to
elaborate norms on minority rights and to devise monitoring procedures on this sensitive issue; indeed,
the impulse to normative elaboration was precisely the recognition of the explosive potential of ethnic
conflict in the region, and the desire. to develop framework standards and "early warning systems" to
cope with such conflict. By themselves, neither organization possesses sufficient clout or resources to
enforce compliance with their expectations. Membership in good standing in both organizations,
however, is of instrumental importance despite the price of intrusiveness in domestic politics.
Membership in the Council of Europe, explicitly chartered as a organization of democracies, grants the
admitted state imprimatur as democratic; membership is accompanied by an elaborate monitoring and
assessment process that is intended to certify minimal democratic.standards, and membership itself is
accompanied by further stipulations of further action necessary to attain the requisite standards .
This process is worth enduring for postcommunist governments, all of which are aware·that no
state failing to obtain Council membership is likelyto receive consideration-for EU and NATO
membership. A similar logic dictates responsiveness to OSCE initiatives. Here membership is not the
issue (all postcommunist states were part of the Helsinki process that produced the OSCE, and only
rump-Yugoslavia has been suspended), but responsiveness to OSCE inquiries and cooperation with
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OSCE envoys is widely understood to be an important yardstick of compliance with Western
expectations. The OSCE and CE norms, then; are not merely an articulation of prevailing international

desiderata; they are backed by the force of conditionality. Thus, it is not a question of whether the
convention produced by the Council of Europe, for example, is binding; rather, it is possible to evoke
such standards as part of the expectations that must be met for membership in NATO and the EU. Some
analysts have found this overarching framework of monitoring compliance with external expectations a
highly coercive context, even to the extent of distorting optimal domestic policy in the region, but it is
coercive precisely to the extent that the ultimate goals of EU and NA TO membership are themselves
valued in the region. 12 The imposition of conditionality in such circumstances, however, is highly
sensitive, particularly where it touches directly on core identity questions. The recently elaborated norms
on minority rights are themselves a departure in international relations, extending the scope of
normatively approved areas in which the state is asked to mortgage its sovereignty by accepting external
intervention in defense of such rights.
The previous analysis provides a context in which to assess the impact of the external
environment on Slovakia's transformation since independence in 1993, a context in which external actors
have attempted to exercise conditionality over the direction of Slovak domestic politics . Slovak
governments have repeatedly reaffirmed the goals of EU and NATO membership as the core features of
foreign policy, a commitment that would seem to dictate maximal responsiveness to external desiderata.
Further, anxious to stabilize and defuse tensions, key international actors have repeatedly voiced concern
with a range of Slovak government policies and initiatives, particularly since Meciar returned to power in
1994. Slovak governments could be in little doubt as to the character of external concerns. The record
of intervention, however, has been mixed and ambiguous. I will briefly review some key features of this
record, and then return to the internal dynamics of Slovak politics to account for the limitations on
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external influence, concentrating on the dimension of this international concern that impinges on the
identity question.
From the promulgation of Slovak independence, Western governments and multilateral
institutions conveyed the strong message that an accommodation with the minority and with the
neighboring Hungarian government were essential to the establishment of Slovakia's eligibility for early
membership in NATO and the EU. The Hungarian question had figured prominently in the negotiation
of Slovakia's re-admission to the Couµcil of Europe in 1993. 13 Slovakia's membership, in fact, went
forward only after a period of uncertainty as to whether Hungary would attempt to block it on the
grounds of the unsatisfactory minority policy of the second Meciar government, and was predicated on
the Slovak government's agreement to make specific concessions to the minority in language use within
six months. It was the next year however, under the Moravcik government, before action was taken, and
these gains proved subject to subsequent erosion under the third Meciar government, as we have seen.
A second, and more complex instance of intervention was the explicit western expectation that
Hungary and Slovakia achieve a formal resolution of their relationship and its outstanding problems; ·
primary among these disagreements was a dispute over the adequacy of Slovakia's commitment to the
recognition of the rights of its Hungarian minority. Accordingly, external pressure for the enactment cif a
Hungarian-Slovak treaty of cooperation and friendship was very pronounced. Both governments
understood, and repeatedly acknowledged, that the stakes of such an agreement centered not only on the
directly favorable consequences defusing of mutual tensions, but also on the larger gains to be accrued
on the road to Europe. In March 1995, the two governments approved such a treaty, in :which Hungary
recognized Slovakia's borders and Slovakia incorporated Council of Europe guidelines on the treatment
of minorities.
It would appear that international intervention had thereby scored a success. The subsequent
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course of events however, presents a more problematic picture, for the price of the agreement wa~ stiff.
The Meciar government faced a revolt of the junior coalition partner Slovak National Party, which had
publicly decried the treaty, and the prospect of being forced to rely on opposition votes for ratification
and even of the dissolution of the government's parliamentary majority. The Hungarian parliament
ratified the accord in June 1995, while repeated postponements of the Slovak ratification debate
punctuated a period of protracted intra-dissension within the MDS-led coalition. Ultimately, the
government achieved coalitional consensus in support of the treaty, but only after the enactment of a
series of additional measures demanded by the SNP, or designed more generally to avoid the perception
that the government was soft on the minority question. These included the passage of legislation
according official status to the Slovak language in November 1995; the enactment of a Law for the
Protection of the Republic--an explicit SNP quid pro quo for treaty ratification; and the reorganization of
Slovakia's regional boundaries that Hungarian politicians charged with gerrymandering Hungarian
population concentrations. Further; the treaty itself was ratified only after the abandonment of plans to
incorporate an appendix that circumscribed treaty-mandated commitments to the CE charter on
minorities. It is unclear that the Hungarian minority is more secure after the treaty proceedings than it
was before.
This course of events did not pass without notice in the West, where concern was already
mounting over the expanding scope of presidential-prime ministerial conflict. A series of demarches by
the EU and western governments punctuated the progress of the domestic imbroglios, sharply worded
warnings that even threatened economic consequences for nonresponsiveness. "The EU members cannot
accept nations that are at odds with democratic ethics," said the French Minister for European Affairs
pointedly in a July 1996 meeting with President Kovac. 14 The Slovak government's posture on these
initiatives adds a further dimension to the problem of marshaling international pressure on the course of
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post-communist transitions, for there are clear indications that it has been seeking alternatives to
dependence on the good will of the West. Even as the government continues to express commitment to
eventual European integration, Meciar warned-in April 1996 that the prospect of early membership was
receding. In tandem with that signal, a forecast that he attributed to the detrimental effects on the Slovak
image of opposition criticism, there has been a continuing, partially improvised search for partners in
exclusion from the west. The past year has seen, for example, warming relations with Serbia, the
recourse to Russian assistance in the retooling of the Mochovce nuclear power plant (a project
sufficiently controversial in the West to jeopardize EBRD funding), and overtures to other·
postcommunist states that cannot expect early admission to "Europe." The Slovak government shows
signs of a search for an alternative means of safeguarding national interests while insulating Slovak politics from the effective pressure ofWest~rn expectations. Analysts have noted Meciar's flirtation with
the development of Slovakia as a bridge to the East, and with the concept of marshaling a Russian
counterweight to economic ties with the West. Such analysts .have been duly skeptical of the realism of
this alternative, and certainly it offers no prospect of a stable institutionalized network of relationships
such as that of Western multilateral institutions. 15
The limitations of Slovak responsiveness to western expectations and incentives become fully
intelligible only when viewed in the context of the earlier analysis of the dynamics of domestic politics.
Meciar's personality and political tactics have constrained his options in government formation. To
maintain a parliamentary majority, his only choice since independence has been to rule with-the Slovak
- National Party, a partner whose own nationalist agenda embraces a clear conception of an ethnically
Slovak ~tate. Indeed, international actors, in their con~ern with Meciar's general record, have
discouraged coalitional alternatives that woulr pair Meciar with parties in the current opposition. 16
However opportunistic Meciar' s own Slovak nationalism may be, his government is, by dint of its
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composition, ill-positioned to demonstrate unambiguous compliance with external expectations on
guarantees for the Hungarian minority and on a broader and more inclusive understanding of the identity
of the Slovak state. -Further, responsiveness to external expectations runs athwart Meciar's own
personalist strategy of power maintenance, marked by a clientilist politics and a populist rhetoric that
undercuts Western desiderata on transparency, tolerance and inclusiveness in governance.

If one can argue that domestic forces are not aligned in such a way as to be readily responsive to
external pressure, the external environment is also important to domestic politics in a less
straightforward sense. Foreign actors and the monitoring process itself have become ancillary arenas for
the propagation of domestic political conflict. Meciar himself has complained of the transference of
domestic political struggle to the arena of international relations, and the way in which it impedes a valid
evaluation of Slovakia's democracy, 17 and it is true that virtually every trip abroad by Slovak politicians
to western capitals, and every foreign visit to Bratislava, breeds a tug of war over just what was said, by
whom, in praise or blame of Slovakia's transformation progress; opposition forces seek to increase
pressure on the government in sensitive legislative battles through the lever of foreign criticism, and the
government in tum seeks to exercise spin control over that criticism by accentuating any positive signals
from abroad.
A case in point, in which the ongoing monitoring process itself became the subject of spin
control, was the November 1996 visit to Slovakia of OSCE High Commissioner for Minorities Max van
der Stoel. Van der Stoel found himself the center of a brief uproar when Meciar claimed that he had
urged that Hungarians show "more loyalty" to the Slovak state. Van der Stoel, whose report on the
minority situation had in fact urged greater government responsiveness to minority needs (with the
proviso that of course Hungarians in Slovakia should be loyal to the state), was forced to maneuver diplomatically around this selective and misleading characterization of his views.
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The awkward positioning of the Slovak govemment--a government that continues to hop~ for EU
and NATO admission--has thus put the state's international image at center stage in domestic politics.
Meciar has repeatedly charged that his opposition is to blame for tarnishing that image, for
politically-motivated criticism of his government thafmisleads foreign opinion. In fact, the government's
hypersensitivity to criticism, a response that placed Meciar number ten on the international Committee
for the Protection of Journalist's list of ten "worst enemies of the press" in 1996, is in no small part a··
function of the recognition that such criticism. is disseminated internationally and may have
consequential effects on the task of joining Europe. The opposition, in tum, claims that he is blaming the
messenger for the bad news.
When international criticism cannot be deflected or reinterpreted, the government takes a
different approach. International expectations are linked to domestic political actors in ways explicitly
designed to delegitimate rival stances. MDS spokesmen charged their critics in the penal code··
amendment controversy with brazenly cooperating with "international political structures, which they
effectively use for fighting against the government coalition."1 8 Meciar's 1994 election campaign
trumpeted MDS independence of foreign interests .
. It should be emphasized that this continued political maneuvering over the relevance of foreign ·
initiatives and commentary is a function of the domestic configuration of Slovak politics, and a battle for
custody of Slovak identity and interests. The opposition, both Slovak and Hungarian, play the
international card to bolster their own power in confrontation with a majority government, while the
government counters by reinterpreting or decrying international influence. The result is that no domestic
policy conflict develops without recourse to international opinion, and international initiatives designed
to signal desirable policy outcomes play into an environment so structured as to preclude any
straightforward connection between foreign pressure--efforts to exercise conditionality--and policy ·
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response.
Of course, Hungarian minority politicians are particularly sensitive players in this dynamic.
Since 1989, Hungarian frustration with limited domestic influence has triggered the search for
compensational leverage by recourse both to multilateral organizations and to the Hungarian government
in search of external allies to support minority rights. Petitions to multilateral organizations
documenting areas of concern have been a staple feature of the response to each new government
initiative that threatens the status of minorities, among the most recent of which was an open letter to
NATO and EU on threats to democracy in Slovakia in October 1996. This is a delicate strategy, since the
expression of grievances derives its power from the impact such unresolved issues have on Slovakia's
acceptance in Europe, and can be construed domestically as a form of political blackmail. The
government thus has a ready response in the battle over image .. Since Meciar first publicly warned
Hungarian politicians against making trouble over Slovakia's admission to the Council of Europe, there
have been continued charges of "defaming" Slovakia abroad.
The resort to Budapest to exert pressure on Bratislava is particularly sensitive. Although a
neighboring state is clearly in a position to champion the interests ofconationals (and indeed Hungarian
governments since the mid-1980s have done so, mindful of domestic opinion), there are two limits to this
strategy. First, such cross-border alliances open politically exploitable questions; Meciar's spokesmen
have repeatedly suggested that Hungarians in Slovakia who tum to Budapest are compromising their
loyalty to the Slovak state, a message that has had particular resonance in domestic politics. Second, the
interests_ofthe Hungarian government and their conationals.in Slovakia do not march in lockstep.
Hungary, too, is positioning itself for NATO and EU membership, and sustained shrillness on the
national question must be tempered in cognizance of the clear interest of Western actors in harmonious
relations between postcommunist states. Support for Hungarian Slovaks in their battles with the Meciar
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government predictably brings official Slovak charges of Hungarian irredentism in the service of
recreating a Greater Hungary, and pulls Hungary into the contentious politics that have impeded
Slovakia'_s acceptance in the n~w European design. Where identity politics are at issue, then, the
extension of domestic battles into the international arena is hardly a risk-free strategy for any of the·
parties involved.

Conclusion
This analysis represents a first attempt to examine more precisely the way in which external
efforts to shape the course of regime change interact with domestic politics, and in particular;the
limitations on such efforts. The embeddedness ofSlovakia's postcommunist transformation in a broader
international context is not merely a sporadic interpolation into a domestic process of reconfiguring the
communist legacy; rather, western monitoring and conditionality efforts have become an integral part of
that process. This is true not only because domestic politics is the primary focus of western attempts to
exercise conditionality, but also because domestic actors play that international card. The international
context thus becomes an important adjunct arena for the playing out of domestic conflict. In this setting,
efforts to exercise conditionality can feed into and fuel domestic conflict. Such efforts carry a
considerable burden: they confront an internal strategic context in which there are powerful limitations,
some of them self-induced, on the capacity to respond to external expectations, ,since Meciar's rivals fear
. electoral consequences of responsiveness to concerns about minority rights, and Meciar' s coalitional
constraints bind him to_ an ethnonational conception of state identity that breeds external disquiet. If
theorizing on the international dimensions of democratization is to advance, more work is needed to ·
compare and schematize such problematic interactions.
The Slovak case is distinctive in several respects, most of all in the polarization of politics in the
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face of the Meciar phenomenon. Where the stakes are as high and as comprehensive in their import as
they are in the quest for NATO and EU membership, however, several of the effects noted here replicate
themselves in other cases. A pervasive external impact on domestic politics obtains throughout the
region, and in each case interacts with the strategic context of domestic politics in ways that pose
politically volatile challenges to sovereignty and state autonomy. The temptation of domestic actors to
play the international card in support of preferred policies can create backlash effects, and, more directly,
the overt exercise of conditionality to prove domestically unpopular policies can have similar effects.
Where identity politics is a significant factor in the domestic political areha of multinational stakes, the
penetration of the domestic agenda by the politics of EU and NATO accession is especially delicate.
At the same time, it should be remembered that the basis of external leverage on states like
Slovakia is the realistic hope of membership in these core institutions. In 1997 and 1998, that hope will
be dashed or fulfilled when the first cluster of NATO and EU members from Eastern Europe is identified
as the result of the NATO meeting, in the summer of 1997, and the launching of EU accession talks,
slated for early 1998. If there have been difficulties in exercising conditionality while the expectation of
membership remains alive and immediate, these difficulties will be compounded in the cases where hope
is indefinitely deferred by failure to be included in the first round. If Slovakia is snubbed in this initial
selection process, the need to affix blame may further exacerbate internal tensions. The delays and
ambiguities in Western commitment since 1989 have frustrated many prospective members, but those
delays have had their benefits. Dispelling the ambiguity of who is in, and who is out of Europe in the
immediate future will create a different environment for the exercise of conditionality and for the
dynamics of domestic politics in the states that are left behind in the gray zone.
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TABLE 1
ECONOMIC TRENDS IN THE CZECH AND SLOVAK REPUBLICS,
1990-1996, ANNUAL PERCENTAGE C~GE
Czech Renublic
Inflation
Unemployment
GDP Growth
Slovakia
Inflation
Unemployment
GDP Growth

1991
56.6
4.4
-14.5
1991
61.2
11.8
-15.8

1992
12.7
2.6
-7.1

1993
20.0
3.5
- 0.5

1994
10.7
. 3.5
2.5

1995
9.0
2.9
5.2

1996
8.6*
3.3*
4.4*

1992
10.0
10.4
-7.0

1923
23.2
14.0
-4.6

1994
11.7
14.3
4.2

1995
6.7
13.1
6;8

1996
6.0*
12.3*
.6.0*

*Estimates
Sources: Jan Winiecki, "East Central Europe: A Regional Survey"; Deutsche Bank, OMRI Daily Digest,
FBIS Daily Report on Eastern Europe; World Tables 1994, World Bank (Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1994), pp. 580-583; OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: The Czech and Slovak Republics (Paris:
OECD, Center for Co-operation with the Economies in Transition, 1994); Federal Statistics Office
report, reprinted in Smena, 19 August 1992; PlanEcon Reports.
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